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IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALTMANN DECISION ON 





The law of state succession is one of the most complicated areas of law. 1 
Scholars and politicians have seldom reached a consensus on the exact public 
international law rules in this area. The recent breakup of former Yugoslavia2 
exemplifies some of the difficulties relating to, inter alia, the distinction between 
dissolution and secession, the allocation of debt and assets among successor states, 
and more particularly, the resolution of individual disputes among citizens of 
former Yugoslav republics. The latter issue has been particularly important, as 
numerous individuals have lost their life savings and immovable property during 
the internal war that ravaged former Yugoslavia in the 1990s. These individuals 
are now seeking restitution from successor states. However, the question of 
liability for former Yugoslavia's republics has not been fully resolved even though 
individuals may begin bringing their claims to international tribunals. 
It is possible that such individuals will start looking toward other jurisdictions, 
including the United States. A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision3 expands the 
applicability of the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA")4 by allowing private 
individuals to sue foreign states under the FSIA for conduct that occurred prior to 
its enactment in 1976. This decision might indicate a willingness on behalf of 
American courts to hear more claims against foreign sovereigns for violations of 
international law. Thus, claimholders from former Yugoslavia could now be more 
inclined to bring their grievances to U.S. district courts under the FSIA. 
In order to address this issue, Part I of this article will describe the breakup of 
former Yugoslavia, by first addressing general succession issues before 
concentrating on the more specific questions of property allocation among 
successor states. Part II will present the recent Supreme Court decision by 
outlining its holding and its limitations. Finally, Part III will discuss the 
* Associate, New York City law firm. This Article represents the views of the author only and 
not those of her law firm. B.A., Rutgers College; J.D., Cornell Law School; Maitrise en Droit, 
Universite Paris I-Pantheon-Sorbonne; D.E.A. Private International Law, Universite Paris 1-Pantheon­
Sorbonne. 
1. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PuBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 654 (4th ed. 1990). 
2. Before its breakup, former Yugoslavia was known as Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia ("SFRY''). See The Agreement on Succession Issues Between the Five Successor States of 
the Former State of Yugoslavia, June 29, 2001, 41 I.L.M. 3 (2002) [hereinafter Vienna Agreement]. 
3. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S.Ct. 2240 (2004). 
4. 28 u.s.c. § 1602 (2000). 
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implications of this recent decision on former Yugoslavia's claimholders' prospects 
of introducing successful FSIA-based claims to American tribunals. Part III will 
end with a discussion regarding the utility and fairness of allowing more claims 
against foreign sovereigns, such as the former Yugoslav republics, to be litigated in 
U.S. courts.5 
I. THE BREAKUP OF FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 
The dismantlement of former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s was not an easy 
process. Besides the internal wars and atrocious human rights violations 
throughout the country, numerous state succession issues plagued the dissolution 
process. Because of the sensitive political context and tension among former 
republics, negotiations have been difficult and even when a final agreement was 
reached in Vienna in 2003,6 the most sensitive issues were deliberately left out. 
Thus, it is now up to the new states to bilaterally resolve such issues, which involve 
restitution to citizens of former Yugoslavia who lost their property during the wars, 
as well as the allocation of successor states' responsibility regarding the 
wrongdoings of the post-World War II communist regime. Since successor states' 
governments might be slow and inefficient in providing a solution to these issues, 
private plaintiffs with pending claims could bring their disputes to international 
tribunals in hope of faster relief. No international forums have yet ruled on the 
merits of any such claims, but recent developments in European and American 
jurisprudence might indicate the international community's willingness to deal with 
former Yugoslavia's succession issues. 
A. General Context 
When former Yugoslavia ceased to exist in the early 1990s, its dismantlement 
caused many legal problems regarding the allocation of the country's property. In 
particular, the issue of debt and asset distribution has plagued succession 
negotiations among successor states.' The difficulty underlying the issue of 
property allocation is both legal and political, as the country has been tom apart by 
violence and internal wars. Deciding whether the country's breakup amounted to 
secession or to dissolution carries important consequences regarding debt and asset 
distribution because this determination affects successor states' legal and political 
rights in a crucial manner. With the help of the international community, an 
agreement was finally reached among successor states in Vienna in 2001.8 
5. In fact, this article uses former Yugoslavia as an example, but the same reasoning, regarding 
jurisdiction in U.S. courts under the FSIA over a foreign sovereign, can be equally applied to other 
recently dismantled states, such as the former USSR and the former Czechoslovakia. 
6. See Part 1.A.3 infra for a full discussion of this Agreement. 
7. Milos Trifkovic, Fundamental Controversies in Succession to the Former SFR Yugoslavia, 
in 33 SUCCESSION OF STATES: DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 187, 188 (Mojmir Mrak ed.). 
8. See Vienna Agreement, supra note 2. 
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However, while this agreement resolved some of the outstanding issues, other 
problems still exist among former Yugoslav republics. 
1. The Conflict and Crisis in Former Yugoslavia 
In the late 1980s, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY") 
suffered a financial crisis.9 Because of poor economic planning and populist 
promises, the Yugoslav federation experienced such a staggering inflation rate that 
the federal government launched a "shock therapy" plan intended to curb inflation 
and to boost foreign investment. 10 The country's political situation paralleled the 
economic debacle. In 1990, new nationalistic movements started forming in 
Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The new political pluralism was 
clearly anti-communist and anti-federation, and new nationalist parties won 
elections throughout the year. 11 In Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic was elected 
president with 65% popular vote. 12 Thereafter, the Serbian Assembly suspended 
Kosovo's government and parliament, signaling rising nationalism and a rejection 
of decentralization of the political and economic systems. 13 
Several political forces emerged thereon. On one side, Milosevic advocated a 
"strong Serbia" as the leading force in a "strong Yugoslavia." On the other side, 
the newly elected governments of Croatia, Slovenia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
were fighting for decentralization and independence from the Yugoslav federation. 
Several other factors contributed to this troubling internal situation. First, the 
military was seen as mostly Serbian in its higher cadres and as strongly pro­
federation, which caused suspicion about the role of the army within the other 
republics. 14 Second, the Serbian leadership's attempt to maintain a centralizing 
policy came at a time of great distress. In fact, the 1990 economic package, 
launched under an International Monetary Fund ("IMF') Stand-by Agreement and 
a World Bank Structural Adjustment Loan, "required large budget cuts and 
redirection of federal revenues toward debt servicing."is In order to implement this 
requirement, the federal government suspended transfer payments to the 
9. See Valerie Bunce, The Elusive Peace in the Former Yugoslavia, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 
709, 712 (1995) on the economical situation of Yugoslavia. 
10. Guido Acquaviva, The Dissolution of Yugoslavia and the Fate of its Financial Obligations, 
30DENV.J.INT'LL.&POL'Y 173, 174(2002). 
11. See Konrad G. Buhler, State Succession, Identity/Continuity and Membership in the United 
Nations, in LA SUCCESSION D'ETATS: LA CODIFICATION A L'EPREUVE DES FAITS - STATE 
SUCCESSION: CODIFICATION TEsTED AGAINST THE FACTS I87, 274-78 (Pierre Michel Eisemann & 
Martti Koskenniemi eds., 2000). 
12. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at I74. 
13. See Buhler, supra note I I, at 274-78. 
I4. For an interesting analysis of the spreading of Yugoslav nationalism(s), see OLIVIER 
LADISLAV KUBLI, Du NATIONALISME YOUGOSLAVE Aux NATIONALISMES POST-YOUGOSLAVES 
(I 998); see also LAURA SILBER & ALLAN LITTLE, YUGOSLAVIA: DEATH OF ANATION ( 1996). 
15. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at I75. 
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government of the republics and autonomous provinces, thereby creating more 
discomfort and distrust toward the federal authorities. 16 
The international community was mostly unwilling to deal with this troubling 
situation. 17 While the international focus of the world in 1991 remained on the Gulf 
War and on Moscow.is the first military outbreaks took place in Croatia. Serbs 
from the Krajina region declared their willingness to remain part of Yugoslavia in a 
local referendum. Franjo Tudjman, the Croatian leader, and Milosevic secretly met 
to discuss possible partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 19 Slovenia and Croatia 
declared their sovereignty at the end of June, followed by Macedonia20 in 
September. The European Community ("EC") began an arms embargo in July, in 
an effort to ease the situation.21 Furthermore, the EC established a "Peace 
Conference" on Yugoslavia22, and the United Nations Security Council adopted a 
resolution for an embargo on arms sales to Yugoslavia.23 However, these efforts 
remained virtually useless regarding conflict resolution in Yugoslavia and the 
international community did little to propose any real action or diplomatic solution 
for the developing crisis. 
In October 1991, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia 
were on the verge of becoming independent states, leaving Serbia and Montenegro 
as the two remaining constituents of the Yugoslav federation. On April 27, 1992, 
Serbia and Montenegro declared the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY") to be 
the "continuation" of the dismantled SFR Y.24 In the meantime, the EC decided to 
take a bold stand: it would only recognize newly independent countries in Eastern 
16. MICHEL CHOSSUDOVSKY, THE GLOBALISATION OF POVERTY 246 (1997). See also SUSAN 
WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLtrnON AFTER THE COLD WAR 40 (1995). 
17. The United States, the European Community, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, and Russia seemed to support the idea of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav 
federation. This attitude strengthened the perception of the Yugoslav and Serbian leaderships that 
independence for Slovenia, Croatia, and any other republic was not supported internationally. See Marc 
Weller, The International Response to the Dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 569, 570 (1992). 
18. In one of the strangest coups in history, the leader of the former USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev, 
was declared "sick" and then promptly came back under the protective wing of Boris Yeltsin. 
Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 175-76. 
19. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 175. 
20. Macedonia is now recognized under the name of "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia" 
and it was admitted to the United Nations in April of 1993. See Susan Woodward, Are International 
Institutions Doing Their Job?, 90 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 471, 473 (1996). For the purpose of this 
article, the denomination of "Macedonia" will be adopted. 
21. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 176. 
22. The EC agreed to convene a peace conference on Yugoslavia at a meeting held in Brussels 
on August 27, 1991. The peace conference was also to establish an arbitration procedure to enhance the 
rule of law in the settlement of disputes. After many disagreements, an Arbitration Commission was 
formed with Mr. Badinter as Chairman. The Commission [hereinafter Badinter Commission] received 
full support from the United States and the USSR, but was replaced by the UN/EC International 
Conference on Yugoslavia in August of 1992. For more information on the Badinter Commission, see 
Maurizio Ragazzi, Introductory Note, Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission: Opinions on 
Questions Arising From the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, 311.L.M. 1488, 1488-90 (1992). 
23. S.C. Res. 713, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. SIRESnl3 (1991), available at www.un.org (last 
visited Oct. 30, 2004). 
24. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 178. 
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Europe if they were able to meet stringent criteria, 25 new to the international law on 
state recognition.26 While these new standards, had they been followed by the EC 
itself and other major countries, such as the United States, non-aligned countries, 
and the newly indepen~ent Russia, could have promoted a more coherent approach 
toward state recognition, they remained short-lived. At the end of 1991, Germany 
decided to unilaterally recognize Slovenia and Croatia as independent countries, 
choosing not to adhere to the previously agreed-on substantive standards.27 The 
rest of the EC followed on January 15, 1992, recognizing the same two former 
Yugoslav republics without following the proposed standards. The EC then 
recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 6, 1992,28 but refused to do so 
regarding Macedonia.29 The United States, too, recognized Slovenia, Croatia, and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina on April 7, 1992.30 The recognition of these new countries 
happened while horrific war crimes and human rights violations were taking place 
25. See The Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet 
Union, available at http://ejil.org/journaVVoll4/Nol/art6.html [hereinafter Guidelines]. The Guidelines 
were issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting in Brussels, on December 16, 1991, as part of the 
Declaration on Yugoslavia. In the Guidelines, member states agreed to "recognize, subject to the 
normal standards of international practice and the political realities in each case, those new states which, 
following the historic changes in the region, have constituted themselves on a democratic basis, have 
accepted the appropriate international obligations and have committed themselves in good faith to a 
peaceful process and to negotiations." See Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 90-91 (1992). The Guidelines explained that the process of 
recognition required, inter alia, "commitment to settle by agreement [ ...] all questions regarding state 
succession and regional disputes." For a discussion regarding the relevance of this specification, see 
European Community: Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New 
States, 31 LL.M. 1485, 1487 (1992). 
26. Scholars in international law generally agree that an entity satisfying the four criteria of 
statehood (territory, permanent population, government and capacity to conduct international relations) 
does not need any kind of recognition by the international community to become a member. See 
generally P.K. MENON, TuE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1994). 
27. See Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 5, On the Recognition of the Republic of Croatia by 
the European Community and its Member States, Jan. ll, 1992, 31 LL.M. 1503, 1505 [hereinafter 
Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 5] (suggesting Croatia was not fully "ready" to be recognized 
because the Constitution of December 4, 1991 did not sufficiently incorporate the suggested provision 
on the autonomy of minorities; however, written reiteration by President Tudjman of the commitment to 
protect minorities was deemed sufficient). As for Slovenia, see Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 7, 
On International Recognition of the Republic of Slovenia by the European Community and its Member 
States, Jan 11, 1992, 31 LL.M. 1512, 1512-17 (declaring that Slovenia met the requirements). On the 
question of legality of secession by Croatia and Slovenia, see Richard lglar, Comment, The 
Constitutional Crisis in Yugoslavia and the International Law of Self-Determination: Slovenia's and 
Croatia's Right to Secede, 15 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 213, 228 (1992). 
28. See Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 4, On International Recognition of the Socialist 
Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina by the European Community and its Member States, Jan ll, 1992, 31 
LL.M. 1501, 1503. On the particular international situation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Matthew 
Craven, The European Community Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia, 66 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 333, 
375 (1995). 
29. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 6, On International Recognition of the Socialist Republic 
of Macedonia by the European Community and its Member States, Jan 11, 1992, 31 LL.M. 1507. The 
EC decided not to recognize Macedonia despite the Badinter Commission's opinion that it should, 
because of the Greek veto. See Acquaviva, supra note l, at 178. 
30. Acquaviva, supra note l, at 178 n. 20 (citing The United Nations recognized Slovenia, 
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on May 22, 1992 (U.N. Press Release, ORG/1156, Jan. 19, 1993)). 
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia.31 The political environment throughout the 
former Yugoslav states was one of hostility and violence, thus preventing effective 
negotiations among parties from talcing place. 
2. Dissolution Versus Secession and Related Succession Issues 
According to the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of 
Treaties32 and the Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property, Archives and 
Debts,33 the succession of states is defined as "the replacement of one State by 
another in the responsibility for the international relations of territory."34 In cases 
of universal succession, the predecessor state ceases to exist. For example, when 
Zanzibar and Tanganyika decided to unite in 1964, they ceased to exist and a new 
state, Tanzania, was formed.35 In other cases, however, the predecessor state can 
remain in existence. When the Thirteen colonies seceded from Great Britain, the 
latter was not affected in its existence.36 This principle does not mean, however, 
that all of the obligations of the predecessor state remain in force as if nothing had 
happened: some may be passed on to the successor state, some may remain in the 
realm of the predecessor state, some may be transformed, and some may cease to 
exist. Thus, the modification of a state does not automatically entail the 
modification of its obligations.37 
In the context of former Yugoslavia, neither one of the simple hypoµteses 
applies. On the contrary, there is significant debate about whether the state 
succession that occurred represented "dissolution" or "secession."38 The 
terminology, far from causing purely semantic issues, implies important legal 
consequences and differing conclusions regarding debt and asset allocation among 
the former Yugoslav states.39 
31. See S.C. Res. 752, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RESn52 (1992), reprinted in 31 1.L.M. 1451, 
1452 (demanding compliance with the April 12, 1992 cease-fire and urging to stop "violent 
deterioration" of the situation) and S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/RESn57 (1992), reprinted 
in 31 l.L.M. 1453, 1454 (calling for "immediate cessation of forcible expulsions and attempts to change 
the ethnic composition of the populace"). 
32. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, August 23, 1978, 17 
l.L.M. 1488, 1490. 
33. Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, April 8, 1983, 22 
I.L.M. 298, 308. However, this Convention has never entered into force and it is largely thought not to 
reflect customary international law. See Eli Nathan, The Vienna Convention on Succession of States in 
Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY: 
EsSAYS IN HONOUR OF SHABATI ROSENNE 489 (Y oram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1989). 
34. Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, supra note 32, at 1490; 
Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, supra note 33, at 308. 
35. See DANIEL PATRICK O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 (1967); The Acts of Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Apr. 27, 1964, 3 
l.L.M. 763, 764. 
36. See O'Connell, supra note 35, at 88-91. 
37. See Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 185. 
38. Trifkovic, supra note 7, at 188-89. 
39. For a more detailed discussion on dissolution v. secession in general as well as in the context 
of former Yugoslavia, see Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 185-94. 
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If the former SFRY fell apart through decay of its institutions and through 
transfer of sovereign powers from the federation back to the republics, then the 
dismantlement process would be one of dissolution. Furthermore, the armed 
conflict in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina could be deemed an aggression. 
On the other hand, if the SFRY disappeared by the secession of several republics, 
then the conflict would amount to a civil war because the "act of secession violated 
the right to self-determination" of the Serb minorities living in the seceding 
republics.40 
The legal consequences of the above distinction are crucial. If SFRY fell apart 
because of dissolution, all emerging states founded from its former republics would 
have the same position in the succession process. The question of war reparations 
could also arise. In the case of secession, however, FRY would retain the 
international personality of the former SFRY and its position would be politically 
and juridically strengthened, thus excluding the issue of war damages. The 
Badinter Commission solved this legal dilemma.41 In Opinion No. 1, dated 
November 29, 1991, the Commission stated "the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution."42 Furthermore, Opinion No. 8, dated 
July 4, 1992, confirmed this conclusion, by stating "the process of dissolution of 
the SFRY referred to in Opinion No. 1of29 November 1991 is now complete and 
. . . the SFRY no longer exists."43 Finally, in Opinion No. 10 the Badinter 
Commission affirmed that "the FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) is a new state which 
cannot be considered the sole successor to the SFRY."44 Because FRY contested 
the binding character of these opinions while the other successor states adhered to 
them, compromise was greatly needed regarding the most contentious issues. 
Thus, all participants agreed to "refrain from using the terms 'dissolution' and 
'secession,' the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State 
Property, Archives and Debts of 1983 should not be quoted by titles and articles, 
and the technical rules of the Vienna Convention should be interpreted so as to 
encompass rules common to both dissolution and secession ... when feasible."45 
The issue of debt and asset allocation among the successor states required 
more negotiations. A fundamental rule that resulted from the Badinter Commission 
required successor states to consult with each other to achieve an equitable result.46 
According to Opinion No. 13, there was no need to divide assets and liabilities 
proportionally, but the overall result should be an equitable division.47 
40. See Trifkovic, supra note 7, at 188. 
41. See Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 1, reprinted in Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the 
Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination ofPeoples, 3 EUR. J. INT'L 
L. 178, app. 182-83 (1992). 
42. Id. at 183. 
43. See Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 8, reprinted in Danilo Turk, Recognition of States: A 
Comment, 4 EUROP. J. INT'L. L. 66, 74 Annex 3 (1993); Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 1, supra 
note 41, at 182. 
44. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 10, reprinted in Danilo Turk, Recognition of States: A 
Comment, 4 EUROP. J. INT'L. L. 66, 74 Annex 3 (1993). 
45. See Trifkovic, supra note 7, at 188-89. 
46. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 9, July 4, 1992, 31 l.L.M. 1523, 1523-25. 
47. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 13, July 16, 1992, 321.L.M. 1591, 1591-92. 
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Furthermore, all successor states had an obligation to cooperate actively and in 
good faith; if they were to refuse, they would encounter state responsibility toward 
other successor states for damages. 48 Because of already heightened regional 
tensions among successor states, and because of the violent and disputed breakup 
of former Yugoslavia, peaceful negotiations regarding debt and asset allocation 
were impossible among the new states. Thus, Slovenia adopted a different 
solution, consisting of dealing with creditors on a bilateral basis, thereby excluding 
the other successors from the procedure. Other republics started to follow the same 
approach shortly thereafter.49 Consequently, an agreement among all successor 
states was much needed to provide an efficient overall solution to the issue of 
property allocation. 
3. Allocation of Debts - The Vienna Agreement 
The newly formed states of the former Yugoslavia faced many challenges 
regarding property issues. First, successor states had to reschedule and eventually 
pay dues to international creditors.50 In order to do so, FRY had to reach an 
effective and feasible apportionment of the unallocated debts of former Yugoslavia, 
which required its government to give up the claim of being the sole successor of 
the SRFY.5' Thus, an important agreement was signed in Vienna on June 29, 2001 
(the "Vienna Agreement").52 The Vienna Agreement built upon the deals already 
entered by Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, trying to 
reach a consensus acceptable to the FRY, which had acted as the "rogue" state until 
that moment.53 In particular, the Vienna Agreement divided the financial liabilities 
of the former Yugoslavia into three main categories. First, allocated debt, external 
debt whose beneficiary was located in the territory of a specific successor state or 
group of states, remains with the successor state where the final beneficiary is 
located.54 Second, SFRY's external official unallocated debt to members of the 
Paris and London Clubs is to be dealt with according to already negotiated deals by 
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, whereas FRY is to 
assume responsibility for all of its unallocated debt by negotiating directly with the 
members of the two clubs. 55 The corollary of this rule is that successor states are to 
"terminate any existing legal proceedings or financial claims among each other and 
48. Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 12, July, 16, 1992, 32 l.L.M. 1589, 1590. 
49. See Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 206. 
50. See Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 212. 
51. The new FRY government headed by Vojislav Kostunica seemed to have already given up 
the previous position, held by Slobodan Milosevic, thus facilitating the road to negotiations. See IMF 
Approves Yugoslavia's Membership in Fund, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 20, 2000. 
52. Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, at 3. In May of 2001, the central bankers of former 
Yugoslav republics met with the international mediator, Sir Arthur Watts, to agree on the apportionment 
of assets of former Yugoslavia according to the IMF key with some minor variations. The consensus 
reached at this meeting is reflected in the Vienna Agreement. 
53. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 212. 
54. Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, at 25 Annex C. 
55. Acquaviva, supra note 10, at 212. 
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avoid instituting new proceedings or claims."56 Finally, the third category of 
financial liabilities is comprised of all claims against the SPRY not otherwise 
covered by the Vienna Agreement. These claims are to be raised by each successor 
state and to be subsequently considered by the Joint Committee established under 
the Vienna Agreement itself.57 
Although the Vienna Agreement resolved some of the problems related to debt 
and asset allocation among former Yugoslav republics, several contentious issues 
have plagued the negotiation process. In particular, the division of former 
Yugoslavia's assets rekindled political and historical disputes among successor 
states. 
B. Specific Succession Disputes: Division ofState Assets 
In February of 1993, a tentative inventory made by independent consultants 
estimated the net assets of the SPRY as of December 31, 1990 at $60 billion.58 
Military assets represented 75 per cent of the above sum, immovable assets 3.4 % 
and financial assets 21.6 %.59 The division of these assets proved to be a daunting 
task. 
1. Six Points of Contention Among Successor States 
In fact, six sticking points in the negotiations regarding asset division evolved. 
First, the scope and definition of state property was a major point of contention 
between the FRY and the other successor states. 00 While all parties agreed that the 
definition of state property set out in Article 8 of the Vienna Convention in Respect 
of State Property, Archives and Debts ("Vienna Convention")61 applied, "the four 
successor states regard[ed] this definition as a rule of international law, while the 
FRY's view was not clear."62 In fact, the Vienna Convention defines state property 
in terms of the municipal law of the predecessor state as of the date of succession.63 
Thus, one must look into domestic law of the predecessor state to determine the 
scope of the concept of state property. The dispute between the FRY and the other 
56. Id. at 212-13. 
57. Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, at 35 Annex F. 
58. See Ana Stanic, Financial Aspects ofState Succession: The Case of Yugoslavia, 12 EUROP. J. 
I'NTL. L. 751, 755 (2001) (citing Working Groups on Economic Succession Issues of the International 
Conference, "Single Inventory of Assets and Liabilities of the SFRY as of 31 December 1990", 
February 28, 1993). The figure is in U.S. dollars. 
59. In comparison, as of the end of 1991, the total medium-term and long-term debt of former 
Yugoslavia amounted to US $15.99 billion, of which US $3.79 billion was unallocated and US $12.2 
billion was allocated debt. See Stanic, supra note 58, at 758. 
60. See Stanic, supra note 58, at 763. The four other successor states include Croatia, Slovenia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia. 
61. Article 8 provides that state property means "property, rights and interest which, at the date 
of the succession of States, were, according to the internal law of the predecessor State, owned by that 
State." Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, supra note 33, at 310. · 
62. Stanic, supra note 58, at 763. 
63. Vienna Convention in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts, supra note 33, at 310. 
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four successor states relates to the scope of state property under SFRY's domestic 
law.64 According to the FRY, "nothing similar to state property existed in the 
SFRY and ... what constituted state property could only be determined by looking 
at investments and loans made by the federal state authorities and other federal 
funds since 1945."6' The FRY had therefore rejected the legal approach in defining 
state property in favor of an economic approach. This approach was rejected by all 
four successor states and by the Badinter Commission.66 According to the four 
successor states, a legal approach could and had to be taken to define the SFRY's 
property, by reference to federal laws in force at the date of succession. 
Furthermore, the four successor states contended that the past investment approach 
was unworkable as too long and burdensome.67 Thus, the concept of state property 
remained a troubling as it related to asset allocation among former Yugoslav states. 
Second, the issue of internal financial assets and whether these constitute state 
property has been problematic in succession negotiations. ''The FRY has argued 
that internal net financial assets also form part of the SFRY's state property."68 In 
other words, according to the FRY, the net credit position of each republic 
regarding the federal government must be determined, and the financial capital 
flows between the federal government and the republics, corporations and natural 
persons located in them must be calculated. However, because the FRY claimed 
that as the sole successor of the SFRY it represented the federal government, its 
contention was that only the creditor position of the four successor states vis-a-vis 
the federal government should have been determined.69 Thus, under this approach, 
all other republics, except for Slovenia, would have owed money to the federal 
government, or the FRY.70 The four successor states rejected this approach. They 
argued that such an approach was unprecedented under relevant international state 
practice and that the adoption of such an approach would have amounted to double 
counting in accounting terms. 71 Furthermore, assuming that the internal assets 
method was adopted, the FRY's net position vis-a-vis the federal government 
should have also been taken into account, as it was one of the successor states. 
Finally, the four successor states have argued that the "internal financial assets 
approach is unnecessary" and almost "impossible to carry out."72 Instead, the four 
successor states argued that it would have been simpler to divide the federal 
64. Stanic, supra note 58, at 763-64. 
65. Id. at 764 (citing Article 20 of the FRY's Draft Agreement Between the FRY and the 
Successor States, May 4, 1993; Mihajlovic, Ozbiljnije o sukcesiji [Seriously About Succession], VREME, 
March 2001 (letter from Mihajlovic, the head of the FRY's negotiating team, to a Serbian newspaper, 
"Vreme")). 
66. Id. (citing Badinter Commission, Opinion No. 11, 321.L.M. 1586, 1587). 
67. The four successor states also contended that many loan documents had been lost or 
destroyed since some of them dated as far back as 1945. See id. at 764-65. 
68. Id. at 765. 
69. However, since the FRY has since conceded that it is not the sole successor of the SFRY, it 
has abandoned this position. See Vienna Agreement, supra note 2; see also supra note 51 and 
accompanying text. 
70. See Stanic, supra note 58, at 765. 
71. Id. at 765-66. 
72. Id. at 766. 
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balance sheet for the last budget, on December 31, 1990, "by reference to net 
external financiaJ assets."73 
The third sticking point in the negotiations was that the FRY's historic claim to 
certain state property undermined the negotiations process regarding asset division. 
The FRY has claimed "that property of the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro 
and the parts of former Austro-Hungarian monarchy as at the date of the 
establishment of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1918 should not be included in the 
definition of the SFRY's property."74 As part of this historic claim, the FRY has 
argued that it is the only successor to the SFRY's shares in, and gold reserves held 
at, the Bank for IntemationaJ Settlements ("BIS").75 In fact, according to the FRY, 
the gold deposited in the BIS belonged to the Kingdom of Serbia because it was the 
Kingdom of Serbia that was allocated shares in the BIS upon its creation as war 
reparation for the damage suffered by this Kingdom in the First World War and 
because the FRY is the sole successor of the Kingdom of Serbia.76 The BIS 
rejected the FRY's claim as sole successor to the gold and shares mentioned above. 
It froze all of the SFRY's gold reserves and shares.77 In 1997, the BIS invited the 
centraJ banks of Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia to subscribe for a 
nominal number of new shares, thereby enabling them to become members of the 
BIS.78 The old SFRY shares were finaJly apportioned using the key method agreed 
upon by all successor states in the Vienna Agreement. 79 
The fourth issue in asset distribution among former Yugoslav republics was 
whether equitable compensation must be made by the FRY to other successor states 
as a consequence of it becoming the owner of most of the SFRY's immovable 
property.80 According to customary internationaJ law, immovable property within 
the territory of a successor state passes to that state in case of dissolution or 
secession.81 In the case of former Yugoslavia, most of the federaJ organs, 
institutions, research institutions of the federaJ army, military instaJlations and 
factories were located in Serbia. Thus, the adoption of the territoriaJ principle 
would have resulted in an inequitable distribution of the SFRY's net assets because 
the FRY would have received a larger portion of SFRY's assets than liabilities.82 




76. However, for the FRY to be the successor of the Kingdoms of Serbia and Montenegro, these 
Kingdoms would have to have continued to exist as separate entities throughout the existence of both 
the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the SFRY. The FRY's argument is similar to the one invoked by the 
Baltic States regarding their absorption into the USSR. It should be noted, though, that the case of the 
Kingdom of Serbia is different because this Kingdom voluntarily entered into the Kingdom of 
Yugoslavia after the First World War and thus ceased to exist upon the latter country's foundation. Id. 
77. Id. at 767. 
78. See Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, Fifth issue of shares in the third 
tranche of the BIS' s capital, (May 12, 1997), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p9705 l 2b.htm. 
79. See infra, note 97 regarding specific asset distribution key of the Vienna Agreement. 
80. Stanic, supra note 58, at 767. 
81. See Brownlie, supra note l, at 658. 
82. See Stanic, supra note 58, at 767-68. 
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rule of international law and is an application of the principle of equity.B3 The FRY 
has rejected this contention and has argued that the principle of equitable 
compensation has no basis in international law.84 
Fifth, the issue of division of immovable assets situated abroad has been 
contentious in the negotiations process.Bs These assets include the diplomatic and 
consular missions abroad, which were mostly in the hands of the FRY. Initially, 
the FRY objected to the apportionment of immovable assets located abroad. It 
claimed that as the continuing state, it should be entitled to all immovable assets 
abroad under international law.86 However, in 1992 the FRY indicated that it would 
agree to divide immovable assets among successor states.B7 Thus, the issue 
between the parties turned to what key method should be used to divide such 
assets. As early as 1993, the four successor states agreed to an equitable division 
under international law88 using the following key: Bosnia 13 %, Croatia 27.2 %, the 
FRY 35.3 %, Macedonia 8.5 %, and Slovenia 16 %.89 However, because the FRY 
did not initially agree to the above-mentioned key method proposed in 1993, the 
issue was not fully resolved until the Vienna Agreement. 
The issue. of movable property division proved to be the sixth and final 
sticking point. "Financial assets represented the major share of the SFR Y's 
movable property and 21.6 % of its total assets. The foreign exchange reserves of 
[the National Bank of Yugoslavia] stood at U.S. $6 billion as [of] December 31, 
1990. Other assets included quotas accorded to the SFR Y as a member of the BIS, 
the IMF, and the World Bank."90 Under international law, in the case of dissolution 
all movable property should be apportioned proportionately between the successor 
states. 91 However, international law on the apportionment of movable property 
83. Id. at 768. 
84. Id.. 
85. Id. 
86. The rule of public international law in case of secession regarding succession to such assets 
is not completely settled. Some authors argue that because no rule covering such property is spelled out 
in Article 17 of the Geneva Convention, a different rule applies in the case of secession. Other others 
argue that there is no rule of customary international law on this point. See Daniel Desjardins & Claude 
Gendron, Legal Issues Concerning the Division of Assets and Debt in State Succession: The Canada­
Quebec Debate, in CLOSING THE BOOKS: DNIDING FEDERAL ASSETS AND DEBT IF CANADA BREAKS 
UP 11 (John McCallum, ed., 1991). However, the USSR case of secession where ex-USSR property 
abroad was to be apportioned between Russia and other successor states on an equitable basis is 
evidence of recent state practice pointing to the same rule on the division of immovable assets as in the 
case of dissolution. See Stanic, supra note 58, at 769, n.91. 
87. Id. at 769, n.92 (citing Cedic, Cija je imovina u inostranstvu [Whose Property is Abroad], 
PoLmKA, February l, 1997, at 3). 
88. State practice and doctrine seem to support the view that under international law immovable 
assets situated abroad should be apportioned to the successor states in the case of dissolution. See id. at 
768, n.88; O' Connell, supra note 35, at 207. This rule is confirmed as customary international law in 
Article 18(l)(b) of the Convention. Other examples of state practice confirm this view: (1) the case of 
the dissolution of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963; and (2) the agreement between 
Norway and Sweden of March 23, 1906. Stanic, supra note 58, at 768, n.88. 
89. Stanic, supra note 58, at 768-69. 
90. Id. 
91. See O'Connell, supra note 35, at 204. 
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held abroad in the case of secession seems unsettled.92 Before the FRY conceded 
its claim to be the sole successor to the SFRY, the division of such assets would 
have been difficult because of the differing international law rules regarding 
dissolution and secession.93 However, even after the FRY agreed to divide movable 
property among all successor states, the process turned out to be complicated 
because most such assets were in the hands of the FRY. "In fact, the FRY ha[d] 
spent almost all of the above-mentioned foreign currency reserves of the SFRY to 
finance its war machine."94 Furthermore, some of the loans owed by the former 
Soviet Union and Iraq to the SFRY seem to have been settled by Milosevic in 
return for oil and gas supplies.9s Finally, almost all military assets had been under 
the control of the FRY since 1990 and had been destroyed by the time the Vienna 
agreement was reached.96 Thus, the actual division of such movable assets was no 
longer possible and another division key method had to be agreed upon. 
While the Vienna Agreement provided some solutions to the division of 
former Yugoslavia's assets,97 its reach may be of limited importance regarding 
individual property disputes. 
92. Under one doctrinal proposition, the territorial principle governs the succession of such 
movables and all movable property passes to the successor state in which it is situated. See Malcolm N. 
Shaw, The Succession Revisited, 5 FINNISH Y.B. OF INT'L L. 34, 93 (1994). According to a second 
proposition, there should be a distinction between the case of dissolution and secession. Only movable 
assets which can be identified with immovables in the seceding territory pass to that successor state in 
the case of secession while others remain the property of the predecessor state. In the case of 
dissolution, all movable property is apportioned proportionately between the successor states. See 
O'Connell, supra note 35, at 204. Finally, Articles l 7(l)(c) and 18(l)(d) of the Vienna Convention 
adopt the principle of equitable apportionment in the case of movables irrespective of their location and 
with no distinction based on the nature of the state succession. See Vienna Convention in Respect of 
State Property, Archives and Debts, supra note 33, at 314-15. State practice in this area of law does not 
seem to support fully any of the above propositions. However, in the cases of Syria and 
Czechoslovakia, financial assets held in international organizations were apportioned according to 
Articles 17 and 18 of the Vienna Convention. Stanic, supra note 58, at 770, n.96. 
93. In fact, while the FRY claimed to be the sole successor to the SFRY, it claimed that the 
breakup of former Yugoslavia amounted to secession by other successor states. However, this view was 
unsupported by the Badinter Commission, and by all other successor states. See infra, Part 1.A.2 for a 
full discussion on the difference between secession and dissolution. 
94. Stanic, supra note 58, at 771. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. The Vienna Agreement apportioned the assets of former Yugoslavia according to the IMF 
key with minor variations. The assets held by the BIS are apportioned as follows under the Vienna 
Agreement: FRY 36.52 per cent; Croatia 28.49 per cent; Slovenia 16.33 per cent; Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 13.26 per cent; Macedonia 5.40 per cent. Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, at 7. 
Immovable assets abroad were divided under a different key: FRY 39.5 per cent; Croatia 23.5 per cent; 
Slovenia 14.0 per cent; Bosnia and Herzegovina 15.0 per cent. Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, at 9­
10. Other financial assets (including gold deposits, various foreign currency deposits, and securities) 
whether held by the SFRY or the National Bank of Yugoslavia were apportioned as follows: Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 15.5 per cent; Croatia 23.0 per cent; Macedonia 7.5 per cent; Slovenia 16.0 per cent; FRT 
38.0 per cent. Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, at 27. Immovable property located within the territory 
of the SFR Y shall pass to the successor state on whose territory that property is situated, except for 
tangible movable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of one of the successor states and 
which originated from the territory of that state. See the Vienna Agreement, supra note 2, for the full 
text regarding asset division. 
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2. Individual Disputes Regarding Debt and Asset Division in Former Yugoslavia 
Many citizens of former Yugoslavia have lost property as a result of the 
country's violent breakup and the terrible financial situation that has plagued most 
successor states. Furthermore, as a result of the SFRY's geographical and political 
decomposition, some citizens' historic claims dating to the Second World War 
might now be extremely difficult to adjudicate. While the Vienna Agreement 
provides an overall asset allocation key, it does not address any of the individual 
grievances resulting from the former Yugoslavia's dismantlement. Thus, such 
individuals might be inclined to turn to foreign jurisdictions for efficient relief and 
substantial remedies. 
Let us address two of the many possible scenarios. First, suppose that Mr. X is 
Serbian98 but that he lived and worked in Croatia until the early 1990s. Mr. X 
owned a house, as well as other movable assets, in his hometown. As the internal 
war erupted in his region, Mr. X, fearing his safety in Croatia, fled his home and 
moved to Serbia. Mr. X lost his house and all other assets and has been living with 
relatives in Serbia, without money or any other belongings. Mr. X would like to 
bring his lost property claim to some forum, but has so far been unsuccessful in 
doing so. For one, the Croatian courts rejected his claim arguing that Mr. X's 
house was actually destroyed during bombings by the Serbian army and that Mr. X 
should thus turn to the Serbian government for reparations. Second, the Serbian 
courts have denied the Croatian courts' argument and claim that Mr. X's property 
was illegally confiscated by the Croatian government. According to the Serbian 
courts, Mr. X should seek monetary restitution from the government of Croatia. In 
this situation, what other remedies could Mr. X seek? The Vienna Agreement 
provides limited, if any, solutions to this problem.99 The former Yugoslavia's 
judicial systems have rejected Mr. X's plight. It seems that the only possible 
solution for Mr. X would be to seek redress in a foreign jurisdiction. 
Second, suppose that Mr. Y is Serbian, but that during World War II, he lived 
in Croatia, where he owned property. His property was confiscated by the 
communist regime immediately following World War II. Mr. Y decides to seek 
restitution for this property loss in 2000, after the SFRY's breakup, and brings a 
claim in Serbian courts. The Serbian courts reject Mr. Y's claim because his 
property is located in Croatia, thus now outside of the FRY's territory. Mr. Y then 
turns to Croatian courts, but they also reject him. stating that as a non-Croatian 
citizen, he cannot seek restitution in Croatia, and that he should turn to his own 
government for monetary compensation. Just like the above example of Mr. X, Mr. 
Y seems to be in dire straits when it comes to the former Yugoslavia's judicial 
system. Similarly, the Vienna Agreement is of limited utility in this situation. 
98. The term "Serbian" in this context means that Mr. X is ethnically Serbian; also, Mr. X in this 
context has become a citizen of the FRY after former Yugoslavia's breakup. 
99. Note the difficulty of the issue of war reparations, which is linked to this fact pattern and 
which is discussed above, see supra Part l.A.2. Furthermore, note that this issue is not addressed by the 
Vienna Agreement. 
2004] IMPUCATIONS OF THE ALTMANN DECISION ON FORMER YUGOSLAV STATES 53 
Thus, Mr. Y might, exactly like Mr. X, decide to seek the help of foreign courts and 
judicial bodies. 
As of the date of this article, only one international tribunal has claimed 
jurisdiction over claims held by citizens of former Yugoslav republics. 100 Its future 
decision on the merits will certainly shed more light on complicated succession 
issues. However, its acceptance of jurisdiction might instigate more former 
Yugoslav states and more private litigants to bring their claims before other 
international fora. 
Republics might sue other republics in the ICJ, arbitration panels might 
conduct proceedings among governments, and private litigants might also tum to 
specific tribunals seeking relief. Whether the United States will prove to be an 
attractive forum for former Yugoslav states and private plaintiffs may tum on the 
judicial implementation of a recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Republic ofAustria v. 
Altmann.w• 
II. THE ALTMANN DECISION 
In a recent decision, the U.S. Supreme Court expanded the jurisdictional reach 
of the FSIA of 1976!02 The FSIA authorizes federal civil suits against foreign 
states "as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign state 
is not entitled to immunity"103 under another section of the FSIA or under an 
international agreement. Under the Altmann holding, the FSIA also applies to 
conduct or alleged wrongdoing that occurred prior to the FSIA's 1976 enactment 
and even prior to the United States' 1952 adoption of the so-called "restrictive 
theory" of sovereign immunity. 
A. The FSIA and Its History in American Courts 
The U.S. Supreme Court traditionally deferred sovereign immunity decisions 
to the executive branch!04 Until 1952, executive policy was to automatically 
request immunity in all proceedings against friendly sovereigns. 105 However, in 
that year, the State Department began applying the "restrictive theory," 106 whereby 
l 00. The first international tribunal which has claimed jurisdiction over such a dispute is the 
European Court of Human Rights. See Kovacic, Mrkonjic & Golubovic, Decision on Admissibility of 
Application Nos. 44574/98, 45133/98 & 48316/99 (April 1st, 2004), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/. 
IO l. 124 S. Ct. 2240 (2004 ). At the time of this article, full cite for this decision to the official 
Supreme Court reporter was not available. 
102. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, l602-l6ll (2000). 
103. 28 U.S.C. § l330(a) (2000). 
104. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2248. 
105. Id. 
106. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dept. of State, to Acting U.S. 
Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEPT. STATE BULL. 984-85 (1952) 
[hereinafter Tate Letter]. Under the Tate Letter, "According to the newer or restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard to sovereign or public acts 
(jure imperii) of a state, but not with respect to private acts (jure gestionis) .... [l]t will hereafter be the 
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immunity is recognized with respect to a foreign sovereign for public acts, but not 
for its private acts. 
Even though the change had little impact on federal courts' approach to 
immunity analysis, 107 the new policy caused havoc regarding immunity 
determinations. Foreign nations exercised diplomatic pressure to prompt the State 
Department to file suggestions of immunity in cases where immunity would not 
have been available under the restrictive theory, whereas when foreign countries 
failed to ask the State Department for immunity, the courts had to determine 
themselves whether immunity existed. Thus, responsibility for such determinations 
existed with two different government branches. 108 In order to remedy this 
problem, the FSIA codified the restrictive theory and transferred primary 
responsibility for immunity decisions to the judicial branch. 100 Federal courts have 
jurisdiction under the FSIA over civil actions against foreign states. 11 ° Foreign 
states are generally granted immunity but the FSIA carves out specific exceptions 
under which immunity is denied. In other words, the district court's subject matter 
jurisdiction depends on the availability of one of those exceptions. 
While the FSIA's substantive provisions seem relatively clear, its applicability 
to pre-enactment conduct is not. The U. S. Supreme Court addressed this issue in 
the Altmann decision by responding to the following issue: does the FSIA apply to 
conduct which occurred prior to its enactment in 1976, and more specifically, prior 
to the State Department's 1952 adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign 
immunity? 
B. The Altmann Holding 
The respondent in this case, Maria Altmann, discovered that certain of her 
uncle's valuable pieces of art work had either been seized by the Nazis or 
expropriated by Austria after World War II. She filed an action in Federal District 
Court against the petitioners, the Republic of Austria and the Austrian Gallery, an 
instrumentality of the Republic of Austria, asserting jurisdiction under Section 2 of 
the FSIA, 111 which generally authorizes federal civil suits against foreign states. 
She also claimed that petitioners were not entitled to immunity under the FSIA's 
expropriation exception, 112 which expressly exempts from immunity certain cases 
involving "rights in property taken in violation of international law."113 Petitioners 
Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory... in the consideration of requests of foreign 
governments for a grant of sovereign immunity." Id. 
107. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) (noting that because 
"[a]s in the past, initial responsibility for deciding questions of sovereign immunity fell primarily upon 
the Executive acting through the State Department," courts thus continued to abide by the State 
Department's suggestions of immunity). 
108. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2248-49. 
109. 28 u.s.c. § 1602 (2000). 




112. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000). 
113. Id. 
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moved to dismiss the case based on a two-part claim. First, according to the 
petitioners, as of 1948, when the alleged wrongdoing took place, they would have 
enjoyed absolute sovereign immunity from suit in the U.S. courts because the 
United States did not adopt the restrictive theory of immunity until 1952.114 
Second, nothing in the FSIA retroactively divests them of immunity. The District 
Court rejected this argument by concluding, inter alia, that the FSIA applies 
retroactively to pre-1976 actions. 115 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirrned,1 16 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 111 The Supreme 
Court, which limited its holding to one issue oflaw,118 held that the FSIA applies to 
conduct that occurred prior to the Act's 1976 enactment as well as conduct prior to 
the United States' 1952 adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 119 
The Supreme Court began its analysis by distinguishing this decision from an 
earlier case, Landgraf v. US/ Film Products. 120 In Landgraf, the Supreme Court 
described the general presumption against retroactive application of a statute. It 
declared that if a federal law enacted after the events in suit does not expressly 
prescribe its own proper reach but does operate retroactively, "it does not govern 
absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result. " 121 In other words, if a 
statute would impair rights that a party possessed when she acted, if it would 
"increase her liability for past conduct," or if it would "impose new duties with 
respect to transactions already completed, such a statute is not to be applied to pre­
enactment conduct absent clear congressional intent to the contrary. 122 According 
to the Supreme Court, none of the categories in Landgrafcan be applied to foreign 
sovereign immunity law under the FSIA. 123 However, the FSIA is not simply a 
jurisdictional rule, but a codification of "the standards governing foreign sovereign 
immunity as an aspect of substantive federal law."12 While the FSIA's preamble • 
suggests that the statute applies to pre-enactment conduct, 125 the statement falls 
short of the requisite express congressional prescription. Therefore, the Landgraf s 
default rule does not resolve this case. 126 
114. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240, 2243 (2004). 
115. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1199-01 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
116. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2002), amended by Altmann v. 
Republic of Austria, 327 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2003). 
117. For a full discussion on the factual background and procedural posture of the Altmann case, 
see Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240, 2243-45 (2004) (factual background) and 2245-47 (procedural posture). 
118. Id. at 2243. The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of whether the 
FSIA "applies to claims that, like respondent's, are based on conduct that occurred before the Act's 
enactment, and even before the United States adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in 
1952." Id. 
119. Thus, the Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's ruling but on different grounds. For a 
discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, see id. at 2247. 
120. 511U.S.244 (1994). Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2249-50. 
121. Altmann 124 S. Ct. at 2250-2251. 
122. Id. at 2250-51 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280). 
123. Id. at 2251-52. 
124. Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank ofNig., 461U.S.480, 497 (1983). 
125. The FSIA preamble states that "henceforth" both federal and state courts should decide 
claims of sovereign immunity in conformity with FSIA's principles. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2000). 
126. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2252. 
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court emphasized the particular nature of foreign 
sovereign immunity law, the purpose of which is to give foreign states some 
present protection from the inconvenience of a lawsuit. 127 It is thus more 
appropriate, in this context, to defer to the most recent decisions of the political 
branches on whether to accept jurisdiction than to presume that political decision 
inapplicable just because it postdates the conduct in question. 128 According to the 
Supreme Court, nothing in the FSIA or the circumstances surrounding its 
enactment suggests that it should not be applied to pre-enactment actions. In fact, 
the Supreme Court relied on the FSIA's preamble language that "henceforth", 
foreign states' immunity claims should be decided by American courts in 
conformity with the statute's principles. 129 Thus, assertions of immunity by foreign 
states to lawsuits arising from actions protected by immunity are the relevant 
conduct regulated by the FSIA and are henceforth to be decided by the U.S. courts. 
Congress intended courts to resolve all such claims under the FSIA principles 
regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred.130 
The FSIA's overall structure also supports this conclusion. First, many of its 
provisions "apply to cases arising out of conduct that occurred before 1976,"131 and 
its procedural provisions apply to all pending cases. "It would [thus] be anomalous 
to presume that an isolated provision (such as the expropriation exception at stake 
in this case) is of purely prospective application absent any statutory language to 
that effect."132 Second, the FSIA's applicability to "all pending cases regardless of 
when the underlying conduct occurred is most consistent with two of the [statute's] 
principal purposes: clarifying the rules that judges should apply in resolving 
sovereign immunity claims and eliminating political participation in the resolution 
of such claims."133 Finally, the Supreme Court noted that nothing in its holding 
prevented the State Department from "filing statements of interest suggesting that 
courts decline to exercise jurisdiction in particular cases implicating foreign 
sovereign immunity." 134 
Justice Scalia concurred with the majority opinion, emphasizing FSIA's 
jurisdictional nature. According to Justice Scalia, "the FSIA affects substantive 
rights only accidentally, and not as a necessary and intended consequence of the 
law." 135 Justice Breyer also concurred with the majority opinion, while pointing out 
that the legal concept of sovereign immunity was "about a defendant's status at the 
127. Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479 (2003). 
128. According to the Supreme Court, "the principal purpose of foreign sovereign immunity has 
never been to permit foreign states and their instrumentalities to shape their conduct in reliance on the 
promise of future immunity from suit in United States Courts. Rather, such immunity reflects current 
political realities and relationships, and aims to give foreign states and their instrumentalities some 
present 'protection from the inconvenience; of suit as a gesture of comity."' Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2252 
(quoting Dole Food Co., 538 U.S. at 479). 
129. See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 




134. Id. at 2255. 
135. Id. at 2556 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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time of suit," and not necessarily "about a defendant's conduct before the suit."136 
Thus, an expropriating nation cannot rely at the time of taking, when other 
countries applied absolute foreign sovereign immunity, "that other nations will 
continue to protect it from future lawsuits by continuing to apply the same 
unrestricted sovereign immunity doctrine." 137 
Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Thomas dissented from the majority 
opinion. According to the dissent, written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court 
had to weaken its reasoning and to diminish the rule against the retroactivity of 
statutes. 138 Furthermore, the majority opinion weakened the rule against 
retroactivity in the area of foreign sovereign immunity, where numerous treaties 
and agreements had been reached to the contrary. 139 According to the dissent, the 
majority opinion also injected further insecurity into this area of law, by suggesting 
that the executive branch has power to intervene regarding sovereign immunity 
determinations. In fact, the dissent found that the majority opinion's "reasoning 
also implies a problematic answer to a separation-of-powers question" that the 
majority opinion seems to avoid. 140 According to the dissent, the ultimate result of 
the ruling will be to invite foreign nations to pressure the executive, thereby risking 
"inconsistent results" for private citizens "based on changes and nuances in foreign 
affairs."141 
The FSIA's temporal application has thus been expanded by the majority 
holding in the Altmann decision. While the ruling of this case remains extremely 
narrow,'42 its implications for potential claims against foreign states, such as former 
Yugoslav republicsi in U.S. courts are particularly important. 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF ALTMANN ON FORMER YUGOSLAV STATES 
In light of the Altmann decision, more litigants with outstanding claims against 
foreign sovereigns may be attracted to American courts. For one, foreign states' 
possible defenses under the FSIA will be limited under the Altmann precedent. 
Also, this decision might indicate that the Supreme Court's view of foreign 
immunity has changed, and that it is less willing to excuse foreign states' behavior 
in order to shield them from suit in the United States. The Altmann precedent might 
thus encourage plaintiffs from former Yugoslavia, especially ones with illegal 
expropriation claims, to seek relief in U.S. district courts. 
The implications of the Altmann decision for former Yugoslav states remain 
uncertain, especially in light of other jurisdictional and substantive defenses that 
have not been altered by the case's holding and that such states will be able to 
. assert. Nonetheless, while one might wonder about the justification and the utility 
136. , Id. at 2559 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
137. Id. at 2260 (Breyer, J., concurring). 




142. See infru part Dl(B). 
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of a multiplication of claims against former Yugoslav republics in U.S. courts, this 
outcome seems reasonable and fair in certain circumstances. 
A. FSIA-New Jurisdictional Basis against Former Yugoslav Republics? 
Potential litigants and claimholders against foreign states, in particular against 
the former Yugoslav republics, might turn to international tribunals in order to seek 
relief instead of going through their own countries' often slow and inefficient 
judicial systems. Such litigants might also be attracted to U.S. courts where 
prospects of efficient monetary recovery might seem better. In light of the Altmann 
decision, the foreign sovereigns, including former Yugoslav states, might be more 
limited in exercising their FSIA-based defenses. Furthermore, regardless of the 
availability of defenses under the FSIA, the Altmann decision might indicate a new 
willingness of U.S. courts to hear all reasonable claims against foreign sovereigns. 
Let us imagine the following scenario: Mr. Z is a national of Macedonia, but 
immigrated to the United States during the 1990s following Yugoslavia's internal 
wars and dismantlement. Mr. Z owned property in Croatia, which was confiscated 
by the pro-Nazi Croatian regime during World War II. Immediately before the 
breakup of the former Yugoslavia, Mr. Z sought monetary restitution from the 
Macedonian government for his confiscated property. 143 Macedonia, which did not 
reach a decision until after its separation from former Yugoslavia, refused to 
reimburse Mr. Z according to its territorial policy because Mr. Z's property was 
located in Croatia. Mr. Z then decides to sue the government of Croatia for 
unlawful expropriation in the U.S. courts. 144 Mr. Z asserts subject-matter 
jurisdiction, like Ms. Altmann, under 28 U.S.C. Section 1330(a) of the FSIA. 
Assuming that the U.S. court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and that 
venue is proper, what jurisdictional defenses can Croatia raise in order to defeat 
this claim before it reaches the merits? 
Prior to the Altmann decision, Croatia could have argued that FSIA does not 
apply to any pre-enactment conduct, and that it is immune from suit in U.S. courts 
for its conduct, which occurred prior to 1976, and even prior to the United States' 
adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity. After Altmann, however, this 
defense is no longer available: according to the U.S. Supreme Court, the FSIA 
applies to conduct which occurred prior to its 1976 enactment and foreign 
sovereigns cannot expect to be protected from suit in American courts simply 
because their alleged wrongdoing would have been protected under the absolute 
immunity theory at the time of its occurrence. 145 Thus, Mr. Z could not have sued 
143. Prior to former Yugoslavia's breakup, Macedonia was a part of SPRY. The fact that Mr. Z's 
property was located in Croatia would have been irrelevant because Croatia, too, was a part of the 
SFRY. The federal government of the SFRY would have been responsible for restitution, regardless of 
the fact that Mr. Z applied to his "local" government in Macedonia for alleged expropriation that 
occurred in Croatia. 
144. Let us assume that Mr. Z has decided not to pursue restitution in Croatian courts because he 
now lives in the U.S. and because he has heard that, because Croatian court proceedings are slow and 
inefficient, he would have a better chance of recovery in American courts. 
145. See Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2260-61 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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Croatia for unlawful expropriation in U.S. courts before 1952146 because Croatia 
would have enjoyed absolute sovereign immunity. However, under Altmann, Mr. Z 
can sue Croatia now, in 2004, for the same unlawful expropriation under the FSIA. 
Croatia's conduct will not be immune, even though it occurred before the FSIA's 
enactment and before the 1952 adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity. 
Let us, however, imagine another scenario, more similar to the above­
mentioned case of Mr. X. 1 1 What if Mr. X also decided to sue the Republic of• 
Croatia in U.S. courts for unlawful expropriation under the FSIA, assuming that the 
U.S. court has personal jurisdiction over Croatia and that venue is proper? 
Arguably, this scenario has nothing to do with the Altmann ruling regarding the 
applicability of the FSIA to pre-enactment conduct, because the alleged 
wrongdoing in Mr. X's case occurred well after the FSIA came into force in 1976. 
However, the Altmann decision might affect the jurisdictional outcome of a Mr. X­
like case. In Altmann, the U.S. Supreme Court indicated its willingness to hear 
cases against foreign sovereigns, when such cases involve violations of 
international law for which the sovereign could not have expected to be immune 
forever in U.S. courts. According to Justice Breyer in his concurring opinion: 
What taking in violation of international norms is likely to have been 
influenced, not by politics or revolution, but by knowledge of, or 
speculation about, the likely future shape of America's law of foreign 
sovereign immunity? To suggest any such possibility, in respect to the 
expropriations carried out by the Nazi or Communist regimes, or any other 
such as I am aware, would approach the realm of fantasy. 148 
This approach might suggest that the Supreme Court is not willing to allow foreign 
sovereigns to use the FSIA as a shield, when their conduct was in violation of 
superior norms, such as international law, and when jurisdiction of U.S. courts does 
not seem entirely unreasonable or unfair. 149 Thus, the U.S. courts might tum out to 
be a new alternative forum for claims against former Yugoslav republics, and in 
particular, for claims involving the issue of restitution for unlawful expropriation. 
146. Assuming, of course, the availability of another statute other than the FSIA providing 
subject-matter jurisdiction in U.S. courts, as FSIA was not enacted until 1976. 
147. See supra Part l(B)(2). 
148. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2260 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
149. In fact, if the foreign government is being sued for violations of international law, the U.S. 
courts' jurisdiction is also founded under the universal jurisdiction principle. Even though this type of 
jurisdiction has only been used for heinous violations of international law, such as terrorism or 
genocide, see e.g. K. Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept./Oct. 2001, at 
150; but see H. Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking Judicial Tyranny, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, July/Aug. 2001, at 86, the Supreme Court's reasoning in Altmann might suggest a 
"rapprochement" between universal jurisdiction and jurisdiction under the FSIA for less heinous 
international law violations. 
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B. Limitations ofthe Altmann Holding 
Despite the potential implications of the Altmann decision, ,,amely the 
possibility for former Yugoslav republics to use the FSIA in order to "win" 
jurisdiction of U.S. courts, the case's holding remains extremely narrow. 
First, the Supreme Court declined to comment on the issue of the "act of state" 
doctrine. 
Unlike a claim of sovereign immunity, which merely raises a 
jurisdictional defense, the act of state doctrine provides foreign states a 
substantive defense on the merits. Under that doctrine, courts of one state 
will not question the validity of public acts performed by other sovereigns 
within their own borders, even when such courts have jurisdiction over a 
controversy in which one of the litigants has· standing to c;:hallenge those 
acts. 150 
Instead, redress of grievances arising from such acts is· to be obtained through 
diplomatic channels. 151 According to the Supreme Court, its determination that the 
FSIA applies in this case in no way affects the application of the act . of state 
doctrine. 152 Thus, in-a potential lawsuit by a Croati~n national against the FRY or 
by a Serbian national against Croatia, a ·plaintiff might well be able to win 
jurisdiction under the FSIA, but the defendant government will then be able to 
resort to the act of state doctrine as a substantive defense on the merits. 
Second, the Supreme Court rejected the United States' recommendation to bar 
application of the FSIA to pre-enactment conduct, but specifically stated that the 
State Department is free to. file statements of interest regarding immunity 
determinations in particular cases. m Because the issue in the case was one of 
statutory construction, well within the realm of the judiciary branch, the State 
Department's "views on such an issue ... merit no special deference."154 However, 
should the State Department choose to file a statement of interest regarding the 
exercise of jurisdiction over a particular sovereign, "that opinion might well be 
entitled to deference as" an executive judgment "on a particular question of foreign 
policy."m For example, should the State Department file a statement of interest 
advising against taking jurisdiction in one of the above succession issues among 
former Yugoslav states, courts might be reluctant to go against the executive 
branch and thus less inclined to accept jurisdiction over such disputes. 
150. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2254. 
151. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1897); Banco Na!=ional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 401 (1964) ('The act of state doctrine in its traditional formulation precludes 
the courts of this country from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recogniz:ed foreign 
sovereign power committed within its own territory"). 
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Third, the Supreme Court refused to review the lower courts' determination 
that the FSIA' s expropriation exception 1'6 applied.m In the case of former 
Yugoslav republics, a court might find that jurisdiction could be available under the 
FSIA, but that the taking in question did not amount to expropriation and that the 
FSIA expropriation exception is thus not available. This conclusion would in fact 
render the foreign government immune from suit under the FSIA, provided that no 
other FSIA exceptions to immunity are available. Fourth, nothing in the ruling 
suggests that foreign sovereigns will not be able to raise other jurisdictional 
defenses such as statutes of limitations, personal jurisdiction, improper venue, 
failure to join indispensable parties, or forum non conveniens. 158 Thus, many such 
defenses will remain available to potential defendant governments from former 
Yugoslav states. Fifth, the number of lawsuits will also be limited by the lower 
courts' consensus that FSIA's reference to "violation of international law" does not 
cover expropriations of property belonging to a country's own nationals. 159 Here, it 
is worth noting that a national of Croatia would not be able to sue the Republic of 
Croatia under the FSIA, because even if there had been a taking amounting to 
expropriation, this violation would remain a purely domestic matter and the FSIA 
would fail to provide jurisdictional grounds. Finally, even assuming that a plaintiff 
is able to overcome all jurisdictional obstacles, her claim will remain subject to 
substantive defenses, such as the above-mentioned act of state doctrine, which 
might effectively prevent recovery from foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts. Thus, a 
plaintiff suing one of the former Yugoslav republics would have numerous 
obstacles to overcome even after successfully establishing jurisdiction under the 
FSIA. 
C. Utility and Fairness ofthe Altmann Decision 
One might wonder about the utility of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Altmann. Why did the supreme jurisdiction of the United States decide to limit 
foreign sovereign immunity and to possibly multiply the number of lawsuits 
against foreign states in U.S. courts? Was this a smart decision? Should the U.S. 
courts be hearing claims against former Yugoslav republics and is there a better 
forum for such claims? 
Assuming that the private plaintiff, a national or former national of one of 
former Yugoslav republics, lives in the United States, his use of American courts 
does not seem unreasonable. To force such plaintiffs to litigate their claims in 
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2000). According to this exception, a foreign state shall not be 
immune from suit in U.S. courts in any case "in which rights in property taken in violation of 
international law are in issue ...". Id. 
157. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2247, at 8, n.8. 
158. In fact, respondents in Altmann raised several such defenses, including forum non 
conveniens, failure to join indispensable parties, and improper venue. Id. at 2246 n.6. 
159. See 28 u.s.c. § 1605(a)(3) (2000); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES§ 712 (1986). Thus, neither Mr. X nor Mr. Ywould be able to sue the FRY for the 
same alleged expropriation because they are citizens of the FRY and because the alleged wrongdoing 
was a purely domestic dispute not in violation of international law. 
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other human rights tribunals or one of the "domestic" courts in some former 
Yugoslav republic, would be unfair and would effectively prevent a number of 
such claims from ever being litigated. First, it would be extremely expensive and 
time-consuming for such plaintiffs to travel abroad, to the human rights tribunal's 
location, or back to former Yugoslavia. Second, such plaintiffs might not be able 
to obtain adequate representation in order to litigate abroad, either because they do 
not know anybody, or because they are not familiar anymore with the judicial 
systems. Third, either one of the former Yugoslav republics will certainly have 
more resources to litigate in the United States and it seems entirely more fair to 
force either one of them to U.S. courts than to tell the private plaintiff, living and 
residing in the United States, that his claim in this country is precluded because of 
foreign sovereign immunity. Finally, proceedings in most human rights tribunals 
and former Yugoslavia are extremely slow and the prospects of execution remain 
uncertain. 160 
Furthermore, foreign sovereign immunity is a principle of comity and is aimed 
to avoid embarrassment to foreign nations when they are dragged to American 
courts over some alleged wrongdoings. 161 However, since 1952 it has been well 
settled in American law that foreign sovereigns are immune from suit in U.S. 
courts only for their public acts, but not for private acts. 162 Expropriation 
doubtlessly amounts to a private act, and an expropriating nation can no longer 
expect absolute immunity in the United States. The alleged expropriation in all 
three above-mentioned scenarios represents a private act. Thus, nothing in the 
foreign sovereign immunity concept, as applied and implemented today, suggests 
that Mr. X, Mr. Y, and Mr. Z should be denied access to American courts because 
of comity or other diplomatic concerns. 
Whether such arguments are equally strong regarding plaintiffs living and 
residing abroad remains doubtful. 163 For one, none of the convenience, fairness, 
and judicial economy arguments mentioned above applies in the case of abroad­
domiciled plaintiffs. It would be equally expensive, time-consuming and difficult 
for a plaintiff residing abroad to litigate in the United States as it would be to 
litigate in another foreign country, be it the plaintiffs residence or not. Second, the 
United States appears as a forum non conveniens in such a scenario, with no real 
ties to the litigation or to the plaintiff. 164 Third, personal jurisdiction in civil 
proceedings in the United States rests upon due process notions of "nexus," 
160. Note that most international tribunals' rulings cannot force a country to provide effective 
recovery to a plaintiff, as such plaintiff must still go through his country's judicial system to execute the 
international decision. 
161. Altmann 124 S. Ct. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
162. Id. at 2269 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). . 
163. If a plaintiff living and residing abroad were to bring a FSIA-based claim to U.S. courts, 
arguments against taking jurisdiction based on improper venue.forum non conveniens, and pure judicial 
economy become far more important. 
164. For examples of cases that were dismissed under the forum non conveniens theory, mainly 
because alleged wrongdoings occurred abroad, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 US 235, 238 (1981) 
and In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F.Supp. 842, 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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"reasonableness," and "minimum contacts."165 If a plaintiff domiciled abroad wants 
to sue a foreign government for alleged expropriation that occurred abroad, it 
seems that there is neither nexus nor minimum contacts with the United States, and 
that such a lawsuit would be unreasonable. 166 Finally, in case of a U.S. domiciled 
plaintiff, it seems reasonable to overcome comity and foreign policy concerns in 
order to provide the individual plaintiff with an efficient forum and prospects of 
recovery. On the other hand, in case of a plaintiff with no ties to the United States, 
comity or this country's foreign relations policy might be sufficient to trump such 
individual fairness concerns. In other words, the United States should not risk 
embarrassment related to trying a foreign sovereign in an American court because 
it should not have to protect plaintiffs domiciled abroad, with no substantial links 
to this country. 
It should be noted, however, that American courts are not likely to be 
"flooded" with unreasonable claims by plaintiffs with no nexus with the United 
States. Plaintiffs domiciled abroad are far less likely to tum to American courts 
because of all the inconveniences described above related to the idea of litigating 
abroad. Accordingly, the Altmann· holding seems fair to private plaintiffs and 
justified for at least those plaintiffs who are presently residing in the United States. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is clear that former Yugoslavia's succession issues cannot be resolved 
internally and that some international involvement is necessary in order to provide 
a neutral forum for such discussions and negotiation. 167 The same remains true for 
claims held by private parties against successor states. One international court has 
already accepted to act as a forum for dispute resolution among such litigants. A 
recent U.S. Supreme Court decision might facilitate access to American courts as 
well for the same claims. The utility and fairness of this decision, as has been 
argued above, seem fully justified at least for those potential plaintiffs who are 
residing in the United States. The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, which 
has long ceased to be absolute, should not shield foreign governments from liability 
for violations of international law. If American courts can remedy some of the 
wrongdoings from former Yugoslavia, the Supreme Court is correct in allowing 
them to do so. 
165. See, e.g., Int'! Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945), Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
166. Even though it is not clear whether "minimum contacts," like personal jurisdiction, is also 
required under the FSIA, it doesn't seem unreasonable to draw an analogy using this requirement in 
order to discuss the reasonableness of asserting jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign under the FSIA. 
167. For example, an agreement on succession issues was not reached until 2001. This agreement 
was negotiated with help of the international community and was signed in Vienna, Austria. See Vienna 
Agreement, supra note 2. 
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